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Issue 1

COURT REPORTS

ensure the aquifer would produce safe water. The court examined
SATET's recommendations and concluded that SATET supported this
methodology because of the City of Lansing's opposition to other
approaches, not because this constituted the only scientifically sound
method. The court found that the EPA's technical recommendation
was rooted in Lansing's preference, not in sound science. Also,
because EPA based the numeric concentration on an unquestioned
baseline, not a technical study, the EPA's order lacked a rational basis.
Thus, the court vacated the EPA's order as arbitrary and capricious.
Kirstin E. McMillan

FIFTH CIRCUIT
Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., 250 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 2001)
(affirming summary judgment and holding the protections of the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990 inapplicable to groundwater, because
groundwater is not "navigable water" under the Act).
D.E. and Karen Rice ("Rices") sued Harken Exploration Company
("Harken"), alleging Harken discharged oil into or upon "navigable
waters" in violation of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 ("OPA"). The
United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas granted
Harken's motion for summary judgment because according to the
court's interpretation of OPA and the facts of the case, the Rices could
not sustain a cause of action under OPA. The Rices appealed and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.
The Rices were trustees for the Rice Family Living Trust ("Trust"),
which owned the Big Creek Ranch ("Ranch") in Texas. Harken leased
property on the Ranch, upon which it owned and operated facilities
for exploration, pumping, processing, transporting, and drilling oil.
The Rices alleged Harken discharged hydrocarbons and other
pollutants onto the Ranch and into Big Creek, tributaries of Big Creek,
and other independent ground and surface waters, contaminating or
threatening 9,265.24 acre-feet of groundwater and over ninety
noncontiguous surface acres of the ranch. The Rices alleged Harken
damaged their land through a series of small discharges that occurred
over a long period. Furthermore, they maintained a $38,537,500
clean-up cost for the contaminated soil and groundwater.
The Rices sought application of OPA because it imposes strict
liability for cleanup costs and damages on parties that discharge or
threaten to discharge oil into or upon navigable waters. OPA defines
"navigable waters" as "the waters of the United States, including the
territorial sea."
The Rices argued that the district court's interpretation of
"navigable waters" in OPA was erroneous. They claimed the court
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erred by refusing to apply OPA to inland areas. Since Congress used
the same language in both OPA and the Clean Water Act, the Rices
believed the scope of both scts should be similar. Thus, OPA should
apply to discharges into "waters of the United States," regardless of the
distance of those waters from an ocean or similar body of water. The
Rices also maintained the district court improperly excluded
groundwater from "waters of the United States." They claimed that
Congress, through OPA, intended to regulate all waters that could
affect interstate commerce. Accordingly, the Rices argued that OPA
should impose liability on facilities that discharge oil and related
wastes into any body of water, including groundwater, that affects
interstate commerce. The Rices contended that under the proper
interpretation of "navigable waters," they had a viable OPA claim since
Harken's discharges of oil affected surface water and groundwater
under the Ranch.
The Fifth Circuit stated OPA would have provided the Rices with a
remedy if they could have demonstrated that Harken discharged oil
into a navigable body of water or water adjacent to an open body of
navigable water. Nothing, however, in the record linked Big Creek or
any of the other creeks on the ranch to navigable water as to qualify
for protection under OPA. No evidence existed of any oil discharge
directly into Big Creek or any other intermittent creek containing
above ground water. Rather, the facts demonstrated Harken's various
discharges of oil were all onto dry land, some of which, over time, may
have seeped into groundwater and into Big Creek or another creek.
The court held a generalized assertion that gradual, natural seepage
from contaminated groundwater that will eventually affect covered
surface waters did not establish liability under OPA. Accordingly, the
Rices had no cause of action under OPA for discharges of oil that
contaminated only the groundwater under the Ranch, and the court
deemed summary judgment appropriate.
Kevin R. Rohnstock

NINTH CIRCUIT
United States v. Orr Water Ditch Co., 256 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 2001)
(holding water rights can either be forfeited through five successive
years of nonuse, commencing with initiation of appropriation, or
abandoned due to proof of actual intent via indirect and
circumstantial evidence).
The town of Fernley ("Fernley") applied to the Nevada State
Engineer ("Engineer") to change the manner and place of use of
rights to roughly 280 acre-feet of water from the federal Newlands
Reclamation Project ("Project"). The Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of
Indians ("Tribe") and the federal government opposed the proposed

